

Hon. William L. Dixon  
Hearing Date: September 29, 2023  
Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.  
With Oral Argument

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

AMY GARCIA, ANTHONY GIBBONS, and  
TAYLOR RIELY-GIBBONS, individually  
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT  
OF LICENSING, an agency of the State of  
Washington,

Defendant.

No. 22-2-05635-5 SEA

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FINAL  
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION  
SETTLEMENT

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Since this Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval, the reaction of the Settlement Class has been overwhelmingly positive. Of the nearly 546,000 Settlement Class members, only 20 have opted out of the settlement, and only two have submitted objections—amounting to significantly less than one percent of the Class. Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, thus respectfully request the Court grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of this Class Action Settlement so that Plaintiffs may begin the process of distributing benefits to those members of the Settlement Class who have submitted valid claims.

## II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

### A. Factual Background

Department of Licensing (“DOL”), an agency of the State of Washington, issues licenses for 39 types of businesses and professions. Am. Compl. ¶ 9, Dkt. 7. DOL maintains professional and occupational licensees’ information in a system known as the Professional Online Licensing and Regulatory Information System (“POLARIS”). *Id.* ¶ 10. DOL required Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members to provide certain information to DOL via POLARIS to obtain professional licenses. *Id.* ¶ 12. This information included, but was not limited to, full names, e-mail addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and/or driver’s license or state identification numbers (“Personal Information”). *Id.* In many instances, Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members also provided additional Personal Information as part of the licensing process, including credit card numbers, bank account numbers, routing numbers, telephone numbers, and places of employment. *Id.*

In or before the week of January 24, 2022, DOL became aware of suspicious activity involving professional and occupational license information contained in POLARIS. *Id.* ¶ 16. DOL’s subsequent investigation revealed that POLARIS was accessed in the Data Breach, and Personal Information for approximately 545,901 licensees was stolen, including their names, e-mail addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and/or driver’s license or state identification numbers. *Id.* ¶ 18; Decl. of Timothy W. Emery ISO Motion for Preliminary Approval (“Emery MPA Decl.”) Ex. 1, Dkt. 57. Hackers may also have acquired additional personal information, including credit card account numbers, bank account numbers, routing numbers, telephone numbers, and places of employment. *Id.* ¶ 19.

### B. Procedural History, Discovery, and Settlement Negotiations

On April 18, 2022, Plaintiff Amy Garcia filed this Action against DOL in King County

1 Superior Court, alleging, among other things, that DOL failed to properly protect personal  
2 information in accordance with its duties and that it had inadequate data security. Dkt. 1.  
3 Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on May 6, 2022, that added Plaintiffs Anthony Gibbons  
4 and Taylor Riely-Gibbons. Dkt. 7. Plaintiffs allege a cause of action for negligence and seek  
5 equitable, monetary, and injunctive relief. *Id.*

6         Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, Plaintiffs served DOL with formal written discovery  
7 seeking documents related to the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, any potential defenses thereto, and  
8 class certification. *See* Emery MPA Decl. ¶ 20. DOL filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 24, 2022,  
9 and Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on August 1, 2022. Dkt. 27, 32. Shortly thereafter, the Parties  
10 began to explore resolution through their counsel. Emery MPA Decl. ¶ 22. The Parties agreed to  
11 engage Bennett G. Picker of Stradley Ronon as a mediator to oversee settlement negotiations in  
12 the Action. *Id.* In advance of formal mediation, DOL provided informal discovery related to the  
13 merits of Plaintiffs' claims, potential defenses thereto, and class certification, and the Parties  
14 discussed their respective positions on the merits of the claims and class certification. *Id.* ¶ 23.  
15 Plaintiffs also provided DOL informal discovery related to their experiences with the Data  
16 Breach and their capacity to serve as Class Representatives. *Id.* The Parties participated in  
17 extensive arm's-length settlement negotiations conducted through Mr. Picker that included a  
18 day-long mediation session on February 15, 2023, followed by continued negotiations over  
19 several weeks. *Id.* ¶ 24. Plaintiff Anthony Gibbons also personally participated in the mediation  
20 session with Mr. Picker, and he approves of the Settlement that the Parties reached. *Id.*

21         These protracted settlement negotiations culminated in the Parties agreeing on the form  
22 of a CR 2A Agreement on or about March 28, 2023. *Id.* ¶ 25. The Parties thereafter finalized all  
23 the terms of the Settlement and executed the Settlement Agreement on April 27, 2023. *Id.*

1 **C. Preliminary Approval**

2 On May 11, 2023, this Court granted preliminary approval of this class action settlement.  
3 Dkt. 61. The Court determined the Settlement Agreement was the result of arm’s-length  
4 negotiations between the parties after contested litigation, that it had no obvious defects, and that  
5 it was within the range of reasonable settlement approval. *Id.* The Court also affirmed the form  
6 and content of the proposed notices to be mailed and posted on the internet, concluding they  
7 were adequate to provide notice of the Settlement Agreement to the Class, the requisite  
8 information regarding this settlement, and that the proposed plan for this notice was sufficient.  
9 *Id.* The Court also certified a CR 23(b)(3) settlement class consisting of the people affected by  
10 the data breach. *Id.*

11 **D. Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

12 The Settlement Agreement was previously filed with the Court. Emery MPA Decl. Ex. 1,  
13 Dkt. 57. In addition to addressing the identified security deficiencies, the settlement requires  
14 DOL to pay \$3.6 million into a non-reversionary common settlement fund set up by the  
15 Settlement Administrator (the “Settlement Fund”). This fund will be used to fund (a) settlement  
16 payments, (b) identity theft protection and credit monitoring services, (c) settlement  
17 administration costs, (d) service awards to the Class Representatives, and (e) attorney’s fees,  
18 costs, and expenses. *Id.* ¶ 45. The following summarizes its core terms:

19 **1. The Settlement Class**

20 The “Settlement Class” is defined as:

21 All individuals whose personal information was compromised in the  
22 Data Breach disclosed by the Washington State Department of  
23 Licensing in February 2022. The Settlement Class specifically  
24 excludes: (1) DOL and its officers and directors; (ii) all Settlement  
Class Members who timely and validly submit requests for  
exclusion from the Settlement Class; (iii) any other Person found by  
a court of competent jurisdiction to be guilty under criminal law of  
initiating, causing, aiding or abetting the criminal activity

1 occurrence of the Data Breach or who pleads *nolo contendere* to any  
2 such charge; and (iv) members of the judiciary to whom this case is  
assigned, their families, and members of their staff.

3 *Id.* ¶ 42.

## 4 **2. Consideration**

5 The Settlement Agreement provides for reimbursement of out-of-pocket losses and credit  
6 monitoring services to Settlement Class Members who submit a timely and valid Claim.  
7 Additionally, DOL has committed to improved data security.

### 8 (i) Out-of-Pocket Losses

9 Settlement Class Members who submitted a timely Valid Claim using an approved Claim  
10 Form, along with necessary supporting documentation, are eligible to receive compensation for  
11 unreimbursed out-of-pocket losses, up to a total of \$7,500 per person, subject to the limits of the  
12 Settlement Fund. *Id.* ¶ 51. Out-of-pocket losses include: (i) unreimbursed losses incurred as a  
13 result of the Data Breach, including unreimbursed bank fees, long distance phone charges, cell  
14 phone charges (only if charged by the minute), data charges (only if charged based on the amount  
15 of data used), postage, or gasoline for local travel; (ii) fees for unreimbursed identity protection  
16 expenses, such as credit reports, credit monitoring, or other identity theft insurance products  
17 purchased between January 16, 2022 and May 11, 2023; and (iii) reimbursement for up to 4  
18 hours of time spent remedying issues related to the Data Breach at \$35 per hour. *Id.*

### 19 (ii) Credit Monitoring Services

20 Settlement Class Members are eligible to receive two years of identity theft protection and  
21 credit monitoring services, which includes three bureau credit monitoring and alerts. *Id.* ¶ 56.  
22 This is in addition to the credit monitoring services previously offered to individuals who were  
23 notified of the Data Breach. *Id.* The protection and monitoring provided shall include, at a  
24

1 minimum: (a) Dark Web monitoring, (b) identity restoration and recovery services; and (c)  
2 \$1,000,000 identity theft insurance with no deductible.

3 (iii) Business Practice Commitments

4 As a result of this litigation and settlement, DOL has implemented or will implement  
5 certain reasonable steps to adequately secure its systems and environments (“Business Practice  
6 Commitments”), including the following data security measures:

- 7 • Review of Policies and Procedures. DOL will periodically review and revise its policies  
8 and procedures addressing data security as reasonably necessary.
- 9 • Vulnerability Assessment. DOL will agree to implement automated vulnerability  
10 scanning tools that cover its systems and will set policies for prompt remediation.
- 11 • Firewall Implementation. DOL will agree to place all systems containing PII behind  
12 application firewalls.
- 13 • Limit Remote Access. DOL will agree to configure remote access to its networks in  
14 accordance with industry best practices. This applies to any kind of remote access,  
including node-on-network and node-on-node. DOL will configure all systems to alert  
on unsuccessful administrative account logins.
- 15 • Implement Password Policies. DOL will agree to verify that all default passwords are  
16 changed to follow password policies that comply with best practices.

17 *Id.* ¶ 63. DOL will also maintain a program to educate and train its employees on the importance  
18 of the privacy and security of PII. *Id.* ¶ 64. Actual costs for the implementation and maintenance  
19 of Business Practice Commitments will not be paid from settlement proceeds. *Id.* ¶ 66.

20 **3. Results of the Notice and Claims Process**

21 The Parties implemented the Court-approved Notice Program in coordination with the  
22 approved Settlement Administrator, Kroll Settlement Administration LLC (“Settlement  
23 Administrator” or “Kroll”). Prelim. Approval Order ¶¶ 7–10, 14–15, Dkt. 61. Using records  
24 provided by DOL, Kroll created a database list of Settlement Class Members and verified the  
addresses using multiple methods. Declaration of Scott M. Fenwick of Kroll Settlement  
Administration LLC In Connection with Final Approval of Settlement (“Fenwick Decl.”) ¶ 4.

1 This resulted in mailable address records for 545,729 Settlement Class Members. *Id.* Kroll  
2 caused the Court-approved Notice and Claim Forms to be sent via USPS first-class mail on June  
3 9, 2023. *Id.* ¶ 8.

4 As of July 26, 2023, USPS returned 2,836 Notices with an updated address for such  
5 Settlement Class Members (the period in which USPS automatically forwards the Notice had  
6 expired), and Kroll re-mailed these Notices to the Settlement Class Members at their updated  
7 addresses. *Id.* ¶ 9. As of July 26, 2023, 64,106 notices were returned as undeliverable without  
8 forwarding addresses, and Kroll was able to find new addresses and re-sent the Notices to 54,941  
9 Settlement Class Members. *Id.* ¶ 10. Kroll estimates that Notices were likely delivered to 98.02  
10 percent of the Settlement Class. *Id.* ¶ 11. In addition, Kroll will send Reminder Notice to the  
11 Settlement Class via email (where available) and mail (where no email is available). *Id.* ¶ 12.

12 With input from counsel for the Parties, Kroll established a Settlement Website,  
13 operational as of May 21, 2023, where Settlement Class Members could obtain important  
14 information about the settlement and submit Claim Forms electronically. *Id.* ¶ 5. As of July 26,  
15 2023, the website has received 92,054 views. *Id.* On May 12, 2023, Kroll established a toll-free  
16 phone number to provide Settlement Class Members with additional information regarding the  
17 settlement through both automated messages and live call center representatives. *Id.* ¶ 6. As of  
18 July 26, 2023, the toll-free number has received 4,930 phone calls. *Id.*

#### 19 **4. Claims, Requests for Exclusion, and Objections to Date**

20 Under the schedule established by the Preliminary Approval Order, the deadline for  
21 Settlement Class Members to submit an objection to or request for exclusion from the settlement  
22 is August 9, 2023, and the deadline for Settlement Class Members to submit claims is October  
23 9, 2023. Prelim. Approval Order ¶¶ 14–15; Fenwick Decl. ¶¶ 14, 19.

1 As of July 26, 2023, a total of 9,590 Claim Forms were timely submitted by Settlement  
2 Class Members. Fenwick Decl. ¶ 15. This represents a claims rate of 1.8 percent, which falls  
3 within the average claims rate for this type of settlement.

4 Only 20 requests for exclusion were received by Kroll. *Id.* ¶ 20. As of the date of this  
5 filing, only two objections have been made. *Id.*

### 6 III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES

7 Should this Court enter an order of final approval over this class action settlement when  
8 it provides fair and reasonable relief to the Class, ends expensive and uncertain litigation, and  
9 the Class Notice satisfied due process?

### 10 IV. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

11 Plaintiffs rely upon the Declaration of Scott M. Fenwick of Kroll Settlement  
12 Administration LLC in Connection with Final Approval of Settlement (“Fenwick Decl.”); the  
13 Declaration of Timothy W. Emery In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of Attorneys’  
14 Fees, Costs, and Service Awards (“Emery Fee Decl.”); the Declaration of Timothy W. Emery In  
15 Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval (“Emery MPA Decl.”) and the  
16 Settlement Agreement (“S.A.”) attached thereto as Exhibit 1 (Dkt. 57); and the previous  
17 pleadings and records on file in this matter.

### 18 V. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

#### 19 A. The Settlement Warrants Final Approval.

20 Approval of a class action settlement “take[s] place over three stages. First, the parties  
21 present a proposed settlement asking the Court to provide preliminary approval for both (a) the  
22 settlement class and (b) the settlement terms.” *Rinky Dink Inc. v. Elec. Merch. Sys. Inc.*, No.  
23 C13-1347 JCC, 2015 WL 11234156, at \*1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2015). “Second, if the court  
24 does preliminarily approve the settlement and class, (i) notice is sent to the class describing the



1 terms of the proposed settlement, (ii) class members are given an opportunity to object or opt  
2 out, and (iii) the court holds a fairness hearing at which class members may appear and support  
3 or object to the settlement.” *Id.* “Third, taking account of all of the information learned during  
4 the aforementioned processes, the court decides whether or not to give final approval to the  
5 settlement and class certification.” *Id.*; see also *In re Toys “R” Us-Del., Inc.-Fair & Accurate*  
6 *Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig.*, 295 F.R.D. 438, 448 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

7 When considering final approval of a class action settlement, a court determines whether  
8 the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc.*,  
9 145 Wn.2d 178, 188, 35 P.3d 351 (2001) (*quoting Torrissi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 8 F.3d  
10 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993)). This is a “largely un-intrusive inquiry.” *Id.* at 189. Although the  
11 Court possesses some discretion in determining whether to approve a settlement,

12 [T]he court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement  
13 negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary  
14 to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or  
overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the  
settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.

15 *Id.* (*quoting Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)).

16 Moreover, “it must not be overlooked that voluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred  
17 means of dispute resolution.” *Id.* at 190 (*quoting Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625).

18 In evaluating whether a class settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable,” courts  
19 generally reference the following criteria, with differing degrees of emphasis: (1) the likelihood  
20 of success by plaintiffs; (2) the amount of discovery or evidence; (3) the settlement terms and  
21 conditions; (4) recommendation and experience of counsel; (5) future expense and likely  
22 duration of litigation; (6) recommendation of neutral parties, if any; (6) number of objectors and  
23 nature of objections; and (8) the presence of good faith and absence of collusion. *Id.* at 188–89  
24 (citing 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, *NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS* § 11.43 (3d ed.

1 1992)). This list is “not exhaustive, nor will each factor be relevant in every case.” *Id.* at 189  
2 (*quoting Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625).

3 **B. The Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable.**

4 This settlement provides virtually complete relief to the Class, gives closure for DOL,  
5 fosters judicial efficiency, and furthers public policy. As a matter of “express public policy,”  
6 Washington courts strongly favor and encourage settlements. *City of Seattle v. Blume*, 134 Wn.2d  
7 243, 258 (1997); *see also Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 190 (“voluntary conciliation and settlement are  
8 the preferred means of dispute resolution”). This is particularly true in class actions and other  
9 complex matters where the inherent costs, delays, and risks of continued litigation might  
10 otherwise overwhelm any potential benefit the Class could hope to obtain. *See Class Plaintiffs*  
11 *v. City of Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging a “strong judicial policy  
12 that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned”).

13 The Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Settlement Class Members  
14 were provided claims for: (i) two years of identity theft protection and credit monitoring services,  
15 (ii) cash reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs incurred as a result of the Data Breach (up to  
16 \$7,500 per Class Member), and (iii) cash reimbursement for time expended as a result of the  
17 Data Breach (at \$35 per hour for a maximum of 4 hours per Class Member). Emery MPA Decl.  
18 Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 51, 56.

19 In addition, DOL will pay for (i) all settlement and administration expenses (estimated to  
20 total \$613,350.59), (ii) a maximum of \$1,080,000 for court approved attorneys’ fees, plus costs  
21 and expenses, and (iii) service awards of up to \$6,000 for each of the five Class Representatives  
22 (maximum of \$30,000). *Id.* ¶¶ 76, 85, 87; Fenwick Decl. ¶ 21.

1           **1. Plaintiffs' Likelihood of Success Supports Final Approval.**

2           The existence of risk and uncertainty to the Plaintiffs and Class “weigh heavily in favor  
3 of a finding that the settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 192.  
4 Here, the Plaintiffs and Class sought to hold DOL responsible for a data breach that was  
5 precipitated by the criminal actions of a third party. By litigation standards, data breach cases  
6 are still relatively new. Courts around the country are grappling with what legal principles apply  
7 to these types of claims. Similarly, with the numerous data breaches that have occurred, proving  
8 a class member’s Personal Information was compromised by a particular breach (as opposed to  
9 another) presents challenges for proving causation of damages.

10           Throughout this litigation and settlement process, DOL maintained it was not liable for  
11 any alleged wrongdoing. *See, e.g.*, Mot. to Dismiss FAC, Dkt. 27; Emery MPA Decl. Ex. 1, at  
12 ¶ I.3. Accordingly, although Plaintiffs are confident in the strength of their case against DOL,  
13 the outcome is nonetheless uncertain. There was also a very real risk of a prolonged and  
14 expensive appeals process that DOL was far more financially equipped to handle than Plaintiffs.  
15 While attorneys’ fees and litigation costs would undoubtedly have increased as a result, the  
16 potential recovery for Settlement Class Members would likely not have exceeded the settlement,  
17 even with a win at trial.

18           Class Counsel understood and considered these risks when negotiating the Settlement  
19 Agreement, which eliminates these risks and provides substantial compensation to Class  
20 Members without further delay.

21           **2. The Amount of Discovery and Evidence Supports Final Approval.**

22           Where “extensive discovery” takes place before a class action settlement, final approval  
23 is favored. *See Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 199. This is to ensure the parties have “sufficient  
24 information to make an informed decision about settlement.” *Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*,

1 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998). This information can be obtained through formal or  
2 informal discovery. *See Clesceri v. Beach City Investigations & Protective Servs., Inc.*, No. CV-  
3 10-3873-JLS (RZx), 2011 WL 320998, at \*9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011).

4 Here, Plaintiffs obtained all available public records regarding the Data Breach, as well  
5 as informal discovery related to the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, potential defenses thereto, and  
6 class certification. Emery MPA Decl. ¶ 23. With this information, Class Counsel were prepared  
7 and were able to negotiate a settlement that provides substantial and certain relief for the Class  
8 that is greater relief than most settlements in this arena provide. *Id.* ¶¶ 24, 27–28.

9 **3. The Settlement Terms and Conditions Support Final Approval.**

10 The terms and conditions of the proposed Settlement Agreement support its final approval.  
11 All Class Members who submitted a valid and timely Claim Form remain entitled to the cash  
12 compensation described above and two years of identity theft protection and credit monitoring  
13 services. The latter has a retail value of \$19.99 per Class Member, representing an aggregate  
14 value of \$3,386,625.84 for the 7,059 Class Members who signed up for this valuable service.  
15 Emery Fee Decl. ¶ 7; Emery MPA Decl. Ex. 1, at ¶ 56; Fenwick Decl. ¶ 18. The identity theft  
16 protection and credit monitoring service is designed to protect Class Members from the very  
17 harm alleged in this lawsuit. Specifically, it monitors a Class Member's credit profile and notifies  
18 them of any changes. The service proactively searches the Dark Web (where illegal transactions  
19 of Personal Information occur) and helps facilitate removal of Personal Information on the Dark  
20 Web. Further, in the event a Class Member's Personal Information has been used improperly,  
21 there is \$1 million in insurance benefits available to compensate them for their loss and assist in  
22 remedying the problem. *Id.*

23 As for the cash benefits, Class Members are entitled to \$35 per hour for up to four hours'  
24 worth of time investigating the Data Breach, enrolling in previous credit monitoring made

1 available to them, checking their credit, and otherwise responding to the Data Breach. As of July  
2 26, 2023, 7,740 Class Members submitted claims for lost time, totaling 13,056 hours. Fenwick  
3 Decl. ¶ 16. This amounts to \$456,960 in cash benefits to participating Settlement Class Members.  
4 *Id.*

5 For those Class Members who already incurred damages, they were invited to apply for  
6 extraordinary benefits; *i.e.*, cash compensation for expenses they already paid for up to \$7,500.  
7 As of July 26, 2023, 490 Class Members applied for these extraordinary benefits, for an allowed  
8 amount of \$1,473,247.57. *Id.* ¶ 17.

9 The settlement reached with DOL covers all of the foregoing benefits. Accordingly, the  
10 settlement provides fair, reasonable and adequate recovery in light of the risks of further  
11 litigation.

12 **4. The Positive Recommendation and Extensive Experience of Counsel Support**  
13 **Final Approval.**

14 “When experienced and skilled class counsel support a settlement, their views are given  
15 great weight.” *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 200. Class counsel in the present matter, who are  
16 experienced and skilled in class action litigation, support the settlement as fair, reasonable,  
17 adequate in the best interests of the Class. Emery MPA Decl. ¶¶ 3–17. Class Counsel have  
18 significant class action experience and have litigated the case aggressively and effectively. Given  
19 Class Counsel’s knowledge and experience, Counsel believe the settlement is an excellent result  
20 that provides substantial benefits for Settlement Class Members.

21 **5. Future Expense and Likely Duration of Litigation Support Final Approval.**

22 Another factor the Court considers in assessing the fairness of a settlement is the expense  
23 and likely duration of the litigation had a settlement not been reached. *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 188.  
24 This settlement guarantees substantial recovery and continued credit monitoring services for

1 Class Members while obviating the need for lengthy, uncertain, and expensive litigation.  
2 Continued litigation of this matter would cause additional expense and delay. Although the  
3 Parties conducted significant informal discovery up to this point, substantial work would be  
4 necessary to prepare the case for trial. Expert discovery would be required to prepare for trial,  
5 which would have been expensive to conduct. Even if Plaintiffs had prevailed, justice would  
6 have been delayed. In contrast, the settlement makes substantial monetary relief available to  
7 Class Members in a prompt and efficient manner.

8 **C. The Reaction of the Class Supports Final Approval.**

9 A court may infer a class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable when few, if  
10 any, class members object to it. *See Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 200-01 (approving settlement with  
11 almost fifty objections). Here, the deadline to opt out or object to settlement is August 9, 2023.  
12 As of the date of this filing, only one Class Member formally objected<sup>1</sup> and only 20 Class  
13 Members opted out. Fenwick Decl. ¶ 20. This indicates strong support for the settlement by the  
14 Settlement Class Members and weighs heavily in favor of final approval. *See Hutton v. Nat'l Bd.*  
15 *of Exam'rs in Optometry, Inc.*, 16-cv-3146 JKB, 2019 WL 3183651 at \*5 (D. Md. Jul. 15, 2019)  
16 (finding opt-out rate of .026 percent indicated strong support for settlement of data breach  
17 action).

18 Thus far, 1.8 percent of the Class has submitted claims. Fenwick Decl. ¶ 15. This is within  
19 the average claims acceptance rate for data breach actions. In the *In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach*  
20 *Litig.*, for example, the claims rate was approximately 1.8 percent. 327 F.R.D. 299 (N.D. Cal.  
21 2018) (also noting that class data breach settlements in *In re Home Depot* and *In re Target* had  
22 claims rates of 0.2 percent and 0.23 percent respectively).

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>1</sup> Robert S Miller appears to have filed an objection with the Court on June 20, 2023, but did not serve a copy of the objection on the Parties as required by Paragraphs 70–71 of the Settlement Agreement. *See* Dkt. 62. Mr. Miller's objection is nevertheless discussed in Section V.D.1 below.

1 **D. Only Two Class Members Filed an Objection with the Court.**

2 As of July 26, 2023, 9,590 Settlement Class Members have submitted claims and Kroll  
3 has received just 20 requests for exclusion and one objection. Fenwick Decl. ¶¶ 15, 20. One  
4 additional objection was filed with the Court, but was not served on the Parties. *Id.* ¶ 20; Dkt.  
5 62.

6 In similar situations, courts have typically deemed such a small number of objections as  
7 affirmative support for settlement approval, as the number of objections suggests an overall  
8 favorable reaction from the class. *Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 967 (9th  
9 Cir. 2009) (“The court had discretion to find a favorable reaction to the settlement among class  
10 members given that, of 376,301 putative class members to whom notice of the settlement had  
11 been sent, 52,000 submitted claims forms and only fifty-four submitted objections.”); *see also*  
12 *Churchill Vill. LLC v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 577 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming final approval  
13 where “only 45 of the approximately 90,000 notified class members objected to the settlement”  
14 and 500 class members opted out); *Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.*, No. C98–1646C, C93–0178C,  
15 2001 WL 34089697, at \*8 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2001) (“Over 37,000 notices were sent and  
16 over 3,600 class members contacted class counsel wanting to participate. . . . [L]ess than 1% of  
17 the class opted out and only nine objections were submitted. In view of the widespread publicity  
18 about the settlement, these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement  
19 support a finding of fairness under Rule 23.”).

20 **1. The substance of Mr. Beaufait’s and Mr. Miller’s objections does not raise any**  
21 **material concerns about the settlement.**

22 Although the fact that there were only two objections weighs in favor of approving the  
23 settlement, it is also important to consider the substance of those objections. *See Allen v. Bedolla*,  
24 787 F.3d 1218, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To survive appellate review, the district court . . . must

1 give a reasoned response to all nonfrivolous objections.”<sup>2</sup> The objections were filed by  
2 Settlement Class Members Robert S. Miller (Dkt. 62) and Mark Beaufait (Dkt. 64). Mr. Miller  
3 admits that the Data Breach did not financially affect him, yet requests five years of credit  
4 monitoring, rather than the two years provided to the Class. *See* Dkt. 62. Mr. Beaufait alleges he  
5 was subjected to a “partial email and credit card attack (2 weeks ago), from a combination of  
6 stolen and public information,” but admits it is “impossible to know” whether the attack came  
7 as a result of the DOL Data Breach. *See* Dkt. 64. Mr. Beaufait requests six years of credit  
8 monitoring. *Id.*

9 Mr. Miller’s and Mr. Beaufait’s objections to the duration of credit monitoring, which was  
10 a key component of the compromise and ultimate settlement in this matter, is essentially an  
11 objection that the settlement amount is not enough. Courts routinely reject such objections.  
12 “Settlement is the offspring of compromise; the question . . . is not whether the final product  
13 could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion.”  
14 *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998), *overruled on other grounds by*  
15 *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); *see also Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*, 255  
16 F.R.D. 537, 544 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (quoting *Hanlon* and overruling objections generally  
17 claiming “that the Settlement could have been better by providing different or additional relief,  
18 or by utilizing a different claims procedure” because the settlement was “fair, adequate and free  
19 from collusion”). In this case, the settlement is fair, adequate, and free from collusion—that Mr.  
20 Miller and Mr. Beaufait believe it should be a greater amount does not undermine this  
21 conclusion.

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22  
23 <sup>2</sup> While Washington courts have not explicitly adopted this requirement, “CR 23 is identical to its federal  
24 counterpart, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and thus, federal cases interpreting the analogous federal provision are highly  
persuasive.” *Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc.*, 145 Wn.2d 178, 188 (2001).



1 **E. The Presence of Good Faith and Absence of Collusion Support Final Approval.**

2 In determining the fairness of a settlement, the Court should consider the presence of good  
3 faith and the absence of collusion. *Pickett*, 145 Wn.2d at 201. Here, there has been no collusion  
4 or bad faith. The settlement is the result of extensive negotiations between experienced attorneys  
5 who are highly familiar with class action litigation and the legal and factual issues of this case.  
6 Emery MPA Decl. ¶¶ 22–25. At all times, the negotiations leading to the settlement were  
7 adversarial, non-collusive, and at arm’s length. *Id.*

8 **F. Class Members Received the Best Notice Practicable.**

9 This Court has determined that the notice program meets the requirements of due process  
10 and applicable law, provides the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and constitutes  
11 due and sufficient notice of all individuals entitled thereto. Prelim. Approval Order, Dkt. 61. The  
12 Settlement Administrator implemented the program with the help of Class Counsel. *See*  
13 *generally* Fenwick Decl.

14 To date, the Notice program has been successful. Approximately 534,955 postcards were  
15 delivered successfully. *Id.* ¶ 11. As of July 26, 2023, the Settlement Website had 92,054 views,  
16 and 9,590 claims have been made. *Id.* ¶¶ 5, 15. All told, Kroll was able to achieve direct notice  
17 to approximately 98.02 percent of the Settlement Class. *Id.* ¶ 11.

18 **G. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees are Fair and Reasonable.**

19 By separate motion, Class Counsel will request a fee of \$1,080,000 (30 percent of the  
20 Settlement Fund), plus reasonable costs and expenses. This amount was negotiated only after the  
21 Parties agreed to all substantive terms of the settlement. Emery MPA Decl. ¶¶ 30–31.

22 The requested fee is supported by both the lodestar and percentage-of-the-fund methods  
23 that courts use to determine fees in class action cases. *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 142 F.  
24 Supp.2d 1299, 1301 (W.D. Wash. 2001); *Lobatz v. U.S. West Cellular of California, Inc.*, 222

1 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000) (“the aggregate amount of attorneys’ fees and class settlement  
2 payments may be viewed as a constructive class common-fund”). This requested fee is 30 percent  
3 of the Settlement Fund, which is in line with the benchmark that courts in the Ninth Circuit have  
4 coalesced around. *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011).  
5 However, in reality the percentage is significantly lower because it does not take into account  
6 the value of the equitable relief guaranteed under the Settlement Agreement, including the data  
7 security enhancements DOL has implemented or will implement, as well as employee education  
8 and training. Emery MPA Decl. Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 63–66. When all of the benefits are valued, proposed  
9 Class Counsel’s fee request is far below 30 percent, and imminently reasonable. The amount  
10 requested by Class Counsel in this matter is reasonable and fair in light of the exceptional results  
11 achieved for the Class. Finally, Class Members received settlement notices stating the amount  
12 and percentage of fees Class Counsel requested.

13 **H. The Requested Service Awards are Fair and Reasonable.**

14 DOL agreed to pay a service award in the amount of \$6,000 to each of the five Class  
15 Representatives. *Id.* ¶ 85. Plaintiffs request this Court award them the agreed-upon service  
16 awards in their concurrently-filed Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Service  
17 Awards.

18 “Service” awards “are intended to compensate class representatives for work undertaken  
19 on behalf of a class.” *In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2015).

20 Here, the requested service awards do not create a conflict of interest between the five Class  
21 Representatives and the Settlement Class Members because the service awards are small  
22 compared to the overall settlement relief, there was no agreement between the Class  
23 Representatives and Class Counsel regarding the awards, and the awards are not conditioned on  
24 the Plaintiffs’ support for the Settlement Agreement. The basis for the service awards is purely

1 to compensate Plaintiffs for their time and efforts in initiating the lawsuit, staying abreast of all  
2 aspects of this litigation, cooperating in discovery, responding to discovery requests,  
3 participating in the settlement discussions, and fairly and adequately protecting the interests of  
4 the Settlement Class Members. Thus, the service awards do not constitute preferential treatment.

5 These factors support approval of the settlement.

6 **I. Final Certification of the Settlement Class is Appropriate.**

7 This Court provisionally certified the Settlement Class in the Preliminary Approval Order,  
8 finding that the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) were met. Dkt. 61. Since that time, there  
9 have been no developments that would alter this conclusion. The Settlement Class should now  
10 be finally certified.

11 Certification of a settlement class requires analysis of the factors defined in CR 23. *Pickett*,  
12 145 Wn.2d at 188–89. Washington courts liberally interpret CR 23 because the rule avoids the  
13 multiplicity of litigation, saves class members the costs and trouble of filing individual lawsuits,  
14 and frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation. *Chavez v. Our Lady of*  
15 *Lourdes Hospital at Pasco*, 190 Wn.2d 507, 515 (2018) (citing *Smith v. Behr Process Corp.*, 113  
16 Wn. App. 306, 318 (2002)).

17 **J. The Rule 23 Certification Requirements are Satisfied.**

18 Rule 23(a) requires the following criteria be met in order for a class to be certified: (1)  
19 numerosity of claimants; (2) questions of law or fact are common to the class; (3) the claims of  
20 the class representative are typical of the claims of the class; and (4) the class representative will  
21 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. These prerequisites are met here for  
22 purposes of settlement.

23 **1. The Class is So Numerous That Joinder of All Members is Impracticable.**

24 The numerosity requirement is satisfied where “the class is so numerous that joinder of

1 all members is impracticable.” *Kavu, Inc. v. Omnipack Corp.*, 246 F.R.D. 642, 647 (W.D. Wash.  
2 2007) (court found that sending unsolicited faxes to at least 3,000 recipients satisfied  
3 numerosity). Although there is no specific number required to satisfy the numerosity  
4 requirement, courts generally find that numerosity is satisfied when there are at least 40 class  
5 members. *Our Lady of Lourdes*, 190 Wn.2d at 520; *Agne v. Papa John’s Int’l, et al.*, 286 F.R.D.  
6 559, 567 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Here, the Parties estimate the Class to be comprised of 545,901  
7 individuals. Emery MPA Decl. ¶ 26, Ex. 1 ¶ I.2. It is impracticable to join the more than half of  
8 a million putative Settlement Class Members and the numerosity requirement is clearly satisfied.

## 9 **2. There Are Common Issues of Law and Fact.**

10 It is not necessary that every question of law or fact is common to the class. *Abdullah v.*  
11 *U.S. Sec. Associates, Inc.*, 731 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013). Instead, Rule 23(a)(2) requires only  
12 a “single *significant* question of law or fact.” *Abdullah*, 731 F.3d at 957 (quoting *Mazza v. Am.*  
13 *Honda Motor Co.*, 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012)). Commonality requires courts to “find that  
14 determination of a common contention’s truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the  
15 validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” *Id.* (internal quotations omitted). In this way,  
16 “[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’ even in droves  
17 but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the  
18 resolution of the litigation.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Here, the  
19 Parties have reached a resolution of the litigation, driven in large part by the common issues of  
20 law and fact that apply to the Class Members.

21 In this case, Class Members are all confronted with the same issue: they all allegedly had  
22 their personal information exposed in the Data Breach as a result of DOL’s failure to secure their  
23 personal information. In the absence of class certification and settlement, each individual Class  
24 Member would be required to litigate a long list of common issues of law and fact, all relating

1 to DOL’s alleged common course of conduct that allowed the Settlement Class Members’  
2 Personal Information to be exposed. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18–19, 63–73, Dkt. 7. Rule 23(a)(2)’s  
3 commonality requirement is satisfied. Numerous data breach cases have been certified across  
4 the country for settlement purposes.

5 **3. The Class Representatives’ Claims are Typical.**

6 Representative claims are typical of the class claims if they are “reasonably coextensive  
7 with those of the absent class members.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020; *see also Hansen v. Ticket*  
8 *Track, Inc.*, 213 F.R.D. 412, 415 (W.D. Wash. 2003). The typicality element examines whether:  
9 (1) the case is based on conduct that is not unique to the plaintiff; (2) the class members have  
10 been injured by the same conduct as the plaintiff; and (3) the class members have the same or a  
11 similar injury to the plaintiff. *Agne*, 286 F.R.D. at 568. “When it is alleged that the same unlawful  
12 conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be  
13 represented, the typicality requirement is usually satisfied, irrespective of varying fact patterns  
14 which underlie individual claims.” *Kavu*, 246 F.R.D. at 648 (citing *Smith v. University of*  
15 *Washington Law School*, 2 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1342 (W.D. Wash. 2007)). The plaintiffs’ claims  
16 “need not be identical to the claims of other class members, but the class representative must be  
17 part of the class and possess the same interests and suffer the same injury as the class members.”  
18 *Rodriguez v. Carlson*, 166 F.R.D. 465, 473 (E.D. Wash. 1996).

19 Here, Plaintiffs have the same claims as the Class, and must satisfy the same elements of  
20 every other Class Member. Supported by identical legal theories, Plaintiffs and all Class  
21 Members share claims based on the same course of conduct: DOL’s failure to secure their  
22 personal information. Plaintiffs and all Class Members have allegedly been injured in the same  
23 manner by having their valuable personal information exposed.

1           **4. The Named Plaintiffs and their Counsel Adequately Represent the Class.**

2           The adequacy of representation requirement is satisfied if: (1) the class representative is  
3 represented by qualified and competent counsel; and (2) the class representative’s interests do  
4 not conflict with the interests of the proposed class members. *See Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020; *see*  
5 *also Hansen*, 213 F.R.D. at 415; *Fernandez v. Dep’t of Social & Health Svcs.*, 232 F.R.D. 642,  
6 645 (E.D. Wash. 2005). Plaintiffs satisfy both prongs of the adequacy requirement.

7           First, Plaintiffs and each Class Member allegedly have been injured in the same manner.  
8 *See, e.g.*, Am. Compl. ¶ 73. Plaintiffs assert the same legal claims and theories as those of all  
9 Class Members. Plaintiffs seek the identical relief that would be sought by all members of the  
10 Class. No known conflict exists between Plaintiffs and the proposed Class. *Id.* ¶ 58. Plaintiffs  
11 agreed to assume the responsibility of representing the Class, which includes responding to  
12 discovery requests and diligently pursuing this action in cooperation with counsel. Plaintiffs have  
13 taken their obligations to the Class seriously. Nothing more is required.

14           Second, proposed Class Counsel have extensive experience and expertise in prosecuting  
15 complex actions, including class and data breach actions. *Id.* ¶¶ 3–16. In pursuing this litigation  
16 vigorously, Plaintiffs advanced and will continue to advance and fully protect the interests of the  
17 Class. Accordingly, CR 23(a)(4)’s requirement of adequate representation is satisfied.

18           **5. The Settlement Class Meets the Predominance and Superiority Requirements of**  
19 **Rule 23(b)(3).**

20           If the elements of Rule 23(a) are met, a class action is maintainable if one of the  
21 subsections of Rule 23(b) is also satisfied. *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1022. This action is well-suited  
22 for certification under Rule 23(b)(3) in the context of settlement because questions common to  
23 the Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and  
24 the class action device provides the best method for the fair and efficient resolution of the Class’s

1 claims. *Id.* Indeed, DOL supports class certification for the purpose of effectuating the proposed  
2 settlement. When addressing the propriety of class certification, the Court should take into  
3 account the fact that, in light of the settlement, trial will now be unnecessary, and so  
4 manageability of the Class for trial purposes is not relevant to the Court’s inquiry. *Amchem*  
5 *Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).

6 (i) Common Questions Predominate.

7 A class action is appropriate under CR 23(b)(3) if “questions of law or fact common to  
8 the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”  
9 The predominance requirement is more demanding than the commonality requirement, but does  
10 not demand unanimity of common questions; instead, it simply requires that common questions  
11 outweigh individual issues. *King v. Riveland*, 125 Wn.2d 500, 519 (1994). This inquiry addresses  
12 whether there is a common nucleus of operative facts in each class member’s claim. *Our Lady*  
13 *of Lourdes*, 190 Wn.2d at 516. “When common questions present a significant aspect of the case  
14 and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, there is clear  
15 justification for handling the dispute on a representative basis rather than on an individual basis.”  
16 *Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.*, 244 F.3d  
17 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1022). Even a single individual factual  
18 or legal issue may satisfy the predominance inquiry so long as it is common among the class and  
19 is an overriding issue in the case. *Our Lady of Lourdes*, 190 Wn.2d at 519.

20 Common questions predominate here for purposes of settlement. Common questions  
21 include whether (1) DOL acted negligently in storing Class Members’ personal information; (2)  
22 whether DOL acted negligently in even having the Class Members’ personal information at the  
23 time of the Data Breach; (3) whether DOL had appropriate security measures in place to prevent  
24 the Data Breach; and (4) whether the Class Members’ personal information was used or

1 accessed. Predominance is satisfied.

2 (ii) Class Treatment is Superior to Alternative Methods of Adjudication.

3 The Court should certify the Class if it finds that a “class action is superior to other  
4 available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” CR 23(b)(3). “A class  
5 action may be superior if class litigation of common issues will reduce litigation costs and  
6 promote greater efficiency, or if no realistic alternative exists.” *Connor v. Automated Accounts,*  
7 *Inc.*, 202 F.R.D. 265, 272 (E.D. Wash. 2001). Factors of superiority include whether members  
8 of the class have an interest in individually controlling the litigation, the extent and nature of  
9 litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by other members of the class, the  
10 desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and the  
11 difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class action. CR 23(b)(3).

12 Here, Class Members have not expressed an interest in individually controlling the  
13 litigation because no other lawsuits have been filed. This is likely due to the exorbitant costs  
14 associated with bringing data breach actions because of the document-intensive discovery and  
15 expenses of experts necessary to prove the claims. Judicial economy is enhanced by allowing  
16 these claims to be processed *en masse*. That is why a class action is superior. It is desirable to  
17 concentrate the claims in this forum, which is in Washington State where the DOL operates and  
18 the majority of Class Members reside. Concentrating the claims into one forum and certifying  
19 the class is likely the only way the Class Members’ rights will be vindicated. *Our Lady of*  
20 *Lourdes*, 190 Wn.2d at 524. The Parties have not encountered difficulties with the administration  
21 of this settlement that would rise to the level of preventing class treatment. Indeed, a class action  
22 is the superior method of adjudicating consumer claims arising from this Data Breach—just as  
23 in other, similar, data breach cases where class-wide settlements have been approved. *See, e.g.,*  
24 *In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig.*, 309 F.R.D. 573, 585 (N.D. Cal. 2015); *In re the Home Depot,*



1 *Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, 2016 WL 6902351, at \*2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2016); *In*  
2 *re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, 2009 WL 5184352, at \*6–7 (W.D.  
3 Ky. Dec. 22, 2009). Class treatment is superior for settlement in this case.

4 **K. Plaintiffs Should be Confirmed as Class Representatives and Plaintiffs’ Counsel**  
5 **Should be Confirmed as Class Counsel.**

6 Plaintiffs also request that the Court formally and finally designate them as the Settlement  
7 Class Representatives to implement the terms of the settlement. As detailed above, Plaintiffs will  
8 fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Settlement Class. Plaintiffs’  
9 Counsel should be formally and finally appointed as Class Counsel. They have devoted  
10 significant time and resources to prosecuting this action on behalf of Plaintiffs and the proposed  
11 Settlement Class. Plaintiffs’ Counsel have extensive experience in class actions, particularly  
12 those involving data breaches. Emery MPA Decl. ¶¶ 5–16. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Counsel have  
13 already and will continue to adequately represent the interests of the Settlement Class and should  
14 be appointed as Class Counsel.

15 **VI. CONCLUSION**

16 The Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of the potential  
17 obstacles to recovery in this case and the continued risk of litigation. For these reasons, Plaintiffs  
18 respectfully request the Court enter Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order Granting Final Approval.

19  
20 Dated July 26, 2023.

21 By: /s/ Timothy W. Emery  
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*Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class*

I certify that this memorandum contains  
7,690 words, in compliance with the Local  
Civil Rules.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Jennifer Chong, under penalty of perjury of the laws of the state of Washington, certify and declare that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the following parties on July 26, 2023 as indicated below:

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Dated this 26<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2023, at Seattle, Washington.

/s/ Jennifer Chong  
Jennifer Chong, Legal Assistant